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Police Shootings-Administrative Law
As a Method of Control Over Police:
Peterson P. City of Long Beach
Professor Kenneth Davis has long advocated that police manuals should
be viewed as interpretative administrative rules, which would guide police
in their daily activities. He argued that police departments should not fear
adopting interpretative rules because such rules would not be binding;
therefore, the department would not be subject to tort liability if an officer
violated such a rule.
In Peterson v. City of Long Beach, a police officer violated the police
manual when he shot and killed a non-violent fleeing suspect. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frank Newman, cited Profes-
sor Davis and his call for police administrative rulemaking. Justice
Newman, however, ignored Davis's view that the manual represented non-
binding interpretative rules. Instead, Newman held that the police manual
is a regulation of a public entity and the violation of its rules by a police
officer carries a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The result of Peter-
son is that police departments in California are now subject to tort liabil-
ity when an officer violates the provisions of the department's own manual.
Justice Newman had an opportunity to incorporate Davis's view and in-
troduce California police departments to administrative rulemaking. In-
stead Newman chose to view police manuals as regulations of a public
entity and as an additional source of tort liability for police departments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Police department policy, outlining the use of deadly force, has
often been reduced to written form within police manuals. One of
the chief fears regarding written policy is that it might be used
against the department to impose civil liability.'
In 1968, this fear began to materialize. The California Supreme
Court held in Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles 2 that the failure of
1. Uelmen, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the
Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1973).
2. 69 Cal. 2d 472, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968); text accompanying note
53 infra has additional discussion of the case. In Dillenbeck, the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department had issued "Daily Training Bulletins" which advised how officers
should operate a vehicle under emergency conditions. On January 22, 1962, an of-
ficer, responding to a broadcast ordering all units to the site of a bank robbery,
entered a blind intersection at a speed between 30 to 60 miles per hour with his
siren activated. The officer's vehicle struck a car resulting in fatal injuries to the
driver of that car. The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. The training bul-
letins had advised officers to avoid operating a vehicle in an emergency in excess
of posted speed limit, and to reduce speed in an emergency to 15 miles per hour
when going against a traffic signal in a blind intersection. The court found that the
an officer to follow training bulletins concerning the safe use of
police vehicles constituted evidence of negligence. This decision
was followed in 1970 by Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 3 a case ap-
plying the Dillenbeck rule to the use of firearms by the police.
Grudt held that a police tactical manual on the use of firearms
was admissible on the issues of negligence and intentional torts.
Now these fears have fully materialized. The California
Supreme Court, per Justice Newman, ruled in Peterson v. City of
Long Beach,4 that the violation of a police manual constitutes a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. The court found that po-
lice departments were "public agencies" with rulemaking power
and that police manuals contained rules and regulations, having
the same effect as a statute, ordinance, or regulation with the
"force of law" and with accompanying civil liability for noncompli-
ance.5
Professor Kenneth Davis has long advocated that the police
should be treated as administrative agencies which should abide
by administrative rulemaking procedures. Davis said the police
manual contained interpretive rules which were to guide the po-
lice officer in his daily actions in the field so that arbitrary actions
by officers can be avoided. He felt that officers should not be
guided by their "momentary whims." 6
In Peterson, Justice Newman cited Professor Davis and his call
for police administrative rulemaking. Thus, Newman had a choice
in how he would characterize the police manual. He could have
bulletins were safety regulations of an employer and as such, constituted a stan-
dard of due care. See Morrison, Negligent Operation of a Police Vehicle, 16 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 442 (1967).
3. 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970); text accompanying note
54 infra has additional discussion of the case. In Grudt, the decedent was shot to
death by Los Angeles police officers after a high-speed chase in a high-crime area.
The decedent's car was stopped by a blockade, and officers in plain clothes or-
dered the decedent to exit his vehicle. The officers testified that the decedent then
attempted to run down an officer; whereupon, the fatal shots were fired. Wit-
nesses at the scene disputed the officers' testimony. The police tactical manual
contained rules for the use of firearms. In this type of factual situation, the man-
ual justified the use of deadly force by an officer only if it was necessary to save
himself, a citizen, a fellow officer, or a prisoner from death or grave bodily injury.
The court quoted Dillenbeck and found the manual represented safety rules of an
employer; thus, it was a standard of due care.
4. 24 Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
5. Id. at 244-45, 594 P.2d at 480-81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64; see text accompany-
ing notes 39-41 infra.
6. K.C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 108-11 (1975). It is generally recognized
that there are three types of rulemaking: procedural rulemaking are rules estab-
lished to control an agency's internal operation; interpretive rules are an agency's
interpretation of existing statutes; and, legislative rules issued by an agency are
the equivalent of a statute or ordinance. Legislative rules must be issued pursu-
ant to statutory authority. See text accompanying notes 97-100 infra.
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followed Davis's position and treated police manuals as adminis-
trative regulations, or he could have compared them to local mu-
nicipal regulations. He chose the latter. Justice Newman thereby
declined the opportunity to introduce California police depart-
ments to administrative rulemaking as Professor Davis had advo-
cated for so long.
When Justice Newman elected to treat the police manual as lo-
cal regulations, he determined the outcome of the case. The viola-
tion of local municipal regulations by a municipal employee
carries tort liability. In contrast, the violation of an interpretive
administrative rule carries no such liability.7 After Peterson, any
rule within a police manual, no matter how it is classified, can
now be a standard of care with accompanying civil tort liability.
In applying tort liability to the police manual, Justice Newman
extended the California position far beyond that advocated by
Professor Davis. Davis never advocated tort liability but intended
that police rulemaking be a guide for police, and he felt that tort
liability would discourage such rulemaking.8
This note will examine the Peterson court's reasoning, the case
history leading to this decision, the present state of administra-
tive law on this issue, and the potential impact of this case. The
note will also include a comparison of Peterson with the position
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides: "The failure of a
person to exercise due care is presumed if .... [he] violated a . . . regulation of
a public entity. ... This provision is contrasted with administrative law which
usually provides that the violation of an interpretive administrative rule will not
impose tort liability on police officers. Such regulations merely interpret existing
law, they do not create law. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110; note 8 infra.
8. Professor Davis never advocated tort liability for police rulemaking:
For the purpose to be served by police rules governing or guiding enforce-
ment policies, interpretative rules will be at least as satisfactory as legisla-
tive rules, and they might sometimes be better in that they will not
necessarily be controlling in suits that seek to impose tort liability on po-
lice officers.
K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110. Davis also claimed that police have rulemaking
power for interpretative regulations: "[T]he police have rulemaking power, and
[the] rules they might make on enforcement policy could be legal and constitu-
tional, but the rules would not necessarily have the force of law." Id. at 108. While
Davis qualifies his statements by saying that such rules are not "necessarily" con-
clusive in determining tort liability, the overriding goal of police rulemaking is to
guide police. Tort liability would discourage such guidance and thus, defeat Da-
vis's goal. Professor Uelmen claims that the combined effect of Dillenbeck and
Grudt is to discourage police administrators from making a clear enunciation of
policy. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 25.
taken by the leading scholar on administrative law and police
control, Professor Kenneth Davis.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. The Shooting Incident
Peterson 9 involved a police shooting incident where the officer
fatally shot a fleeing burglary suspect in violation of the depart-
ment's manual but within the confines of California Penal Code
section 196.10
On October 13, 1972, Thomas Rabuchin's apartment was bur-
glarized and his stereo equipment was taken. Rabuchin saw a tall
black man in the apartment's carport the night of the burglary.
The suspect was wearing a letterman's jacket from Long Beach
State College. Rabuchin and his roommate, both students at
Long Beach State, made inquiries which led to their suspicion of
Roland Peterson. On October 18, 1972, Rabuchin and his room-
mate, went to Peterson's apartment where Rabuchin viewed his
stereo inside the apartment after the door was opened in re-
sponse to his knock. Rabuchin left Peterson's apartment and
called the police.
It was at this point the police were misled. Rabuchin's call re-
sulted in a series of police radio transmissions reporting that a
burglary was in progress in Peterson's apartment. Officer Dennis
Vershaw of the Long Beach Police Department [hereinafter
LBPD] arrived first; then Officer John Finn arrived. Vershaw was
met by a group of excited persons who told him to hurry to Peter-
son's apartment because a suspect was on his way to warn the
others. Vershaw went to Peterson's third floor apartment and ap-
prehended a black man on the third floor balcony. Finn arrived
and went to the door of Peterson's apartment, knocked and an-
nounced, "Police. Open the door!" There was a sound of "stam-
peding" to the rear of the apartment. Vershaw went to a place on
the balcony where he could see the rear of the apartment. He
saw a tall black man swing from the third floor to the second floor
balcony and then to the courtyard. Vershaw shouted several
times, identifying himself as a policeman and telling the suspect
9. Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 72 Cal. App. 3d 923, 140 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1977), vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979) (official re-
ports have deleted the appellate opinion, citation will be to the unofficial reports).
The dissent of Justice Hanson of the court of appeal contains the more complete
set of facts, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West 1970): "[Hlomicide is justifiable when
committed by public officers ... in arresting persons charged with [a] felony, and
who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest." See text accompanying
notes 30 and 81 infra.
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to halt. The tall black man stopped and looked at Officer Vershaw
who was in uniform." The suspect then continued his flight. Ver-
shaw, believing the person was a burglar fleeing to avoid appre-
hension, fired his pistol and Roland Peterson was struck in the
head and killed. Rabuchin identified Peterson as the person he
had seen near his apartment on the night of the burglary.
B. The Trial and Appeal
Peterson's parents sued Officer Vershaw and the LBPD for the
wrongful death of their son. They claimed Vershaw was negligent
and unreasonable in firing his gun to prevent Peterson's escape,
because the officer himself was in no danger. During the trial, the
plaintiffs introduced into evidence the LBPD's manual section
4242,12 which forbids an officer from using deadly force against an
11. Vershaw later testified that he made eye contact with the suspect at this
point. The importance of this testimony was never explained; presumably officer
Vershaw wished to emphasize the fact that he believed the suspect saw him in
uniform and identified him as a police officer.
12. LBPD manual § 4242 reads:
The policy of the Department governing the display and discharge of
firearms is that members shall exhaust every other reasonable means of
apprehension before resorting to the use of a firearm.
An officer shall not discharge a firearm in the performance of his police
duties except under the following circumstances and only after all other
means fail:
* In the necessary defense of himself from death or serious injury
when attacked.
* In the necessary defense from death or serious injury of another per-
son attacked.
* To effect an arrest, to prevent an escape, or to recapture an escapee
when other means have failed, of an adult felony suspect when the officer
has reasonable cause to believe that (a) the crime for which the arrest is
sought involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly
force and (b) there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is
sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed.
* To kill a dangerous animal or one that is so badly injured that hu-
manity requires its removal from further suffering and other disposition is
impractical.
* To give an alarm or to call assistance for an important purpose when
no other means can be used.
* For target practice at an approved range.
An officer shall not fire at persons known to be, or suspected of being
juveniles (persons under 18 years of age) except (a) in the necessary de-
fense from death or serious injury when attacked or (b) in the necessary
defense from death or serious injury of another person attacked.
Firearms shall not be discharged under the following circumstances:
* As a warning.
* At moving or fleeing vehicles unless (a) in the necessary defense of
himself from death or serious injury when attacked or (b) in the neces-
sary defense from death or serious injury of another person attacked.
escaping felony suspect when there is no substantial risk that the
suspect will cause death or serious bodily harm or when the
crime which the suspect committed did not involve death or seri-
ous bodily injury.
The trial court, found that (1) Vershaw reasonably believed a
burglary was in progress; (2) Vershaw had reasonable cause to
believe that Roland Peterson had committed the burglary and
was fleeing from the scene; and (3) Vershaw had reasonable
cause to believe that there were no other means to prevent es-
cape other than by firing the shot.13 The trial court concluded
that Vershaw acted reasonably in the use of deadly force and that
the use of such force was justifiable. The trial court cited14 Mur-
phy v. Murray,IS a 1925 case, which allowed a police officer to use
force reasonably necessary to prevent the escape of a suspect
which the officer reasonably and in good faith believed to be an
adult who had committed a felony.
The trial court was reversed on appeal. Justice Thompson of
the California Court of Appeal for the Second District wrote the
majority opinion with Justice Lillie concurring.16 Justice Thomp-
son relied solely on Kortum v. Alkire,' 7 which held police officers
to the same standard of care as a private citizen in the use of
deadly force to arrest a felony suspect. This standard forbids the
use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect "unless the felony is
of the violent variety, i.e., a forcible and atrocious one which
threatens death or serious bodily harm, or where there are other
circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death or serious
bodily harm to the officer or to another."18 As such, the court
140 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.3 (emphasis in original).
13. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 409 n.5.
14. Id. at 408 n.4.
15. 74 Cal. App. 726, 241 P. 938 (1925). Murphy was similar in facts to Peterson.
The officer had been informed that a burglary had been committed at a home. Af-
ter arriving at the home, he was told that two suspects were running away at the
rear of the house. One of the suspects was 16-year-old Murphy. Murphy failed to
obey the officer's order to stop and ran into a grove of trees. The officer fired into
the grove, striking and killing Murphy. It was later determined that the Murphy
boy had performed a Halloween prank by cutting a screen on the house in ques-
tion, entering the back porch, and turning off the electric current. This was the
activity which resulted in the report of the burglary.
16. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
17. 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1977), see note 28 infra for a discus-
sion of the facts in Kortum.
18. Id. at 333, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 31. The court in Kortum recognized that the
police manual in that case was valid because it followed CAL PENAL CODE § 835(a)
(West 1970), which allowed any police officer who has reasonable cause to believe
that the suspect has committed a public offense to "use reasonable force to effect
the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance." The court, however, went
on to hold that its own interpretation prevailed over the code. It is this interpreta-
tion which was the source of the standard of care applicable to private citizens
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found that a burglary, where there is no fear of great bodily harm,
is not a situation where deadly force can be used to apprehend a
fleeing suspect.
Nonetheless, the court of appeal was uneasy with Kortum.
"Unquestionably, Kortum grants a license to burglars and other
'nonviolent' felons to flee apprehension."19 If the felony is nonvio-
lent and the officer can not use deadly force to apprehend the sus-
pect, there is every reason for the suspect to risk the dangers of
fleeing. Yet, the court dismissed this concern stating the problem
belonged with the legislature or the state supreme court.20
More importantly, the court of appeal commented on the police
manual. The first comment was that the LBPD manual was "evi-
dence of a standard of reasonableness but not controlling." 21 This
comment was in agreement with Vallas v. City of Chula Vista ,22 a
case rejecting the idea that a police manual was a statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation the violation of which would be negligence as
a matter of law.
Second, the court compared the three cases of Murphy, Kor-
turn, and Vallas. The court of appeal found that Murphy, which
allowed the use of deadly force on fleeing suspects involved in
nonviolent felonies, was disapproved by the holding in Kortum
because Kortum imposed the standard of care of a private citizen
upon police officers. Then the court found that any implication in
Vallas rejecting the idea that the police manual was a regulation
was overridden.23 The court stated stare decisis required Kortum
to prevail. Yet it should be noted that Kortum, Murphy, and Val-
las had all emanated from courts of jurisdiction equal to that of
and police officers, which forbade the use of deadly force in connection with non-
violent crimes.
19. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
20. Id. Other police departments have their own solutions to prevent this "li-
cense to flee." Some departments allow the use of deadly force on nonviolent flee-
ing felons. The question of whether or not a police department uses deadly force
with nonviolent fleeing suspects is determined by the individual police depart-
ment and not the legislature. Notes 77-92 infra and accompanying text.
21. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
22. 56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 128 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1976). Vallas also involved a police
shooting, where the officer was charged with negligence in the discharge of his
weapon against a fleeing suspect. Both the trial court and the court of appeal up-
held the defendant officer. The trial court allowed the city police manual relating
to officer's use of firearms to be admitted into evidence and considered on the is-
sue of negligence, but it was not considered conclusive. The manual was not
found to be a statute, ordinance, or the regulation of a public entity.
23. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
the court in Peterson.24 As such, the court of appeal was in no po-
sition to officially overrule Murphy and Vallas. In fact, the court
of appeal in Peterson frankly admitted that the trial court had cor-
rectly decided the case by relying on Murphy; however, the court
then found that Kortum was to be given retroactive effect.2 5 This
retroactive treatment was effectuated despite the fact that Kor-
turn was decided in April 1977, which was four and one-half years
after Officer Vershaw had fired his fatal shot of October 18, 1972.26
Indeed, the dissenting justice wondered how Officer Vershaw was
supposed to conform to the judicial interpretation of Kortum
nearly five years in advance of that decision.
In his dissent, Justice Hanson found that there were other rea-
sons for the court of appeal to be uneasy with Kortum. He noted
that Kortum had relied upon Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v.
City of Long Beach27 in arriving at its conclusion that police and
citizens were held to the same standards of care when using
deadly force in apprehension of fleeing suspects. He then noted
that Kortum and Long Beach did not involve civil litigation seek-
ing money damages for negligence in police activity as Peterson
had.28 Rather, Long Beach involved a challenge to the police
24. Id. at 412. All four decisions were issued by the California Courts of Ap-
peal. Kortum and Murphy were issued by the first district; Vallas was issued by
the fourth district; and Peterson was issued by the second district. Although, the
court of appeal did not officially overrule Murphy, it stated that "[elffectively,
however, Kortum overrules Murphy and disapproves the result in Vallas." Id. at
404.
25. Id. at 403-04.
26. Id. at 417.
27. 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1976); see note 27 infra for discus-
sion of the facts.
28. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 412. Long Beach was a challenge by the Long Beach Po-
lice Officer's Association against the very section of the LBPD manual at issue in
Peterson, § 4242. The suit was brought against the City of Long Beach and the
Chief of Police seeking injunctive relief to restrain enforcement of § 4242. The con-
tention was that § 4242 was unconstitutional and preempted by state law. The city
argued that preemption applied because § 4242 went beyond the penal code. The
manual forbade the use of deadly force by an officer except for situations involving
violent crimes, note 11 supra, while California Penal Code § 196(3) allowed the use
of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons even though there was no physical
danger existing to anyone. Note 85 infra and accompanying text.
The trial court upheld the promulgation of the manual section and the court of
appeal affirmed. The court found that the manual section was a reasonable regu-
lation within the powers of the city manager to prescribe, that it was not in conflict
with or preempted by state law. The court found that the manual was not uncon-
stitutional and that it was acceptable as local policy guidance.
Then in Kortum, citizens challenged as invalid the Pleasant Hill Police Depart-
ment's manual section which contained the exact language of California Penal
Code § 835(a), which allows a police officer to use reasonable force to arrest, to
prevent escape, or to overcome resistance. The court of appeal affirmed the trial
court holding the regulation valid. The court of appeal, however, went on to hold
that it would be the judicial interpretation of the statutes or codes relied upon by
the manual which would be determinative. It was only this "judicial interpreta-
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manual by police officers, themselves, and Kortum involved a
challenge to police manual by citizens. Neither case involved the
use of deadly force by a police officer. In addition, Long Beach re-
lied upon cases involving the use of deadly force only by private
citizens and did not discuss cases involving the use of deadly
force by police officers. As such, Justice Hanson found the Long
Beach inclusion of police officers under the same standard as pri-
vate citizens to be "gratuitous," "philosophical," and not neces-
sary in order to arrive at a conclusion. 29 Justice Hanson also
called attention to the fact that the court in Long Beach had
found that the police manual was only for guidance and training,
and would not per se create a basis for liability.3 0
Finally, Justice Hanson noted Officer Vershaw was within the
confines of California Penal Code section 196 which holds that
"[h] omicide is justifiable when committed by public officers ...
in arresting persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing
from justice or resisting such arrest."31 He accused the majority
of rewriting this section "by inserting the words 'forcible and atro-
cious' before the word 'felony' without resorting to constitutional,
statutory, or proper judicial authority."3 2 This, according to Jus-
tice Hanson, was an unwarranted intrusion upon the powers of
the legislative branch.
III. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Ignoring Kortum v. Alkire,33 the California Supreme Court did
not address the issue of whether or not an officer is to be held to
the same standard as a private citizen in the use of deadly force.3 4
The court vacated the decision of the court of appeal and focused
tion" which interpreted the code as holding a police officer and citizen to the same
standard and that deadly force could not be used against a fleeing felony suspect
unless the felony was a violent one.
29. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
30. Id. at 414. This position parallelled that of Professor Davis and also that of
Justice Richardson's dissent in Peterson v. Long Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 594 P.2d
477, 482 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (1979).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West 1970).
32. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 415. "Here, the California Legislature enacted section 196
as written in black ink in the book and it and only it or the people under the initia-
tive process have power to change it by inserting the words 'forcible and atrocious'
before the word 'felony.'" Id.
33. 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1977).
34. Perhaps the court chose to do this in part because of the separation of
on a completely different area of discussion. Evidently, Justice
Newman saw Peterson as the opportunity for the court to intro-
duce the police department to a new concept, which recognizes
that police manuals were regulations of a public entity. Justice
Newman cited Professor Kenneth Davis and his theory that po-
lice departments should use administrative rulemaking proce-
dures. Davis had advocated this because the police officer makes
innumerable decisions in the field; to avoid arbitrary decisions in
the field, Davis believed that administrative rulemaking by the
police department would guide the officer in more detail than
would the general state codes.
ewman, however, used an entirely different analysis than his
cited authority, Davis. Newman first asked whether or not the po-
lice manual contained the rules of a public entity. By the simple
act of asking this question, Justice Newman predetermined the
outcome of the case: Newman was automatically comparing the
police manual to rules of a local public entity. In so doing, New-
man opposed their characterization as administrative rules which
Professor Davis had urged. This distinction in analysis was ex-
tremely significant: a violation of the rules of a local public entity
carries tort liability, while the violation of Davis's interpretive ad-
ministrative rules does not.35
The supreme court found that the police manual, which regu-
lates the use of weapons, does contain regulations of a public en-
tity. Justice Newman, however, did not stop here; he went on to
rule that the police manual also had the force of law. He con-
cluded that if the manual had the force of law, it sets a standard
of care; thus, its violation constituted a rebuttable presumption of
negligence.36 In effect, this decision upheld the results of the
court of appeal and Officer Vershaw was to be presumed negli-
gent unless this presumption was rebutted.
In the opinion, Justice Newman first looked at the question of
whether or not the LBPD manual contains the regulations of a
public entity. Turning to California Evidence Code section 200,
power problem Justice Hanson pointed out in Kortum, but this is speculation as
there was no discussion at all about the appellate court decision.
35. Notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
36. 24 Cal. 3d at 241, 594 P.2d at 478, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Essentially, this was
the limit of the court's discussion of the issue of rebuttal. The court simply con-
cluded the decision by noting that the officer's violation of the manual raised a
presumption of negligence and that "the officer cannot be freed from liability with-
out a judicial inquiry as to whether he could successfully rebut the presumption."
Id. at 247, 594 P.2d at 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 365. There was no further discussion,
and there was no remand of the case to find whether or not this presumption
could be rebutted. The court noted that rebuttal was now to be afforded the de-
fendant but then denied the opportunity to so rebut.
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Justice Newman found that a public entity can be "a nation, state,
county, city and county, city, public authority, public agency or
any other political subdivision, whether foreign or domestic." 37
He also looked to the California Law Revision Commission's defi-
nition of a public entity which commented that "[t]he broad defi-
nitions of 'public entity' includes every form of public
authority."38 Thus, the city was a public entity and Justice New-
man took this to include the office of city manager and the police
department as well. Newman went on to comment that when the
city manager and the police department promulgated the LBPD
manual, they were acting as heads of a public agency; conse-
quently, the manual contained regulations of a public agency.
"When regulations, have been duly prescribed and contain words
that clearly are obligatory," California will not recognize any dis-
tinction between varying degrees of regulations, i.e., all have the
force of law. 39 Section 4242 of the LBPD manual was deemed by
the court to have this obligatory language, e.g., "'An officer shall
not discharge a firearm' and 'Firearms shall not be discharged.' "40
Since the manual was issued by a public entity with words that
are "clearly obligatory," the police manual contained regulations
which establish a standard of care. In support of this conclusion,
Justice Newman cited Davis and his call for police administrative
rulemaking to eliminate any chance of arbitrary policy making by
the officers in the field. 4 1 Professor Davis, however, never advo-
cated that tort liability should be a result of police administrative
rulemaking.4 2
The court then proceeded to apply California Evidence Code
section 669(a): 'The failure of a person to exercise due care is
presumed if . . .he violated a . . .regulation of a public entity
.... ,"43 After finding that the violation of the LBPD manual
37. Id. at 243-44, 594 P.2d at 479, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (emphasis in original);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 200 (West 1966).
38. 24 Cal. 3d at 244, 594 P.2d at 479-80, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
39. Id. at 245-46, 594 P.2d at 480-81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
40. Id. at 244 n.4, 594 P.2d at 480 n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.4; note 11 supra.
41. 24 Cal. 3d at 245, 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 480, 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 364 n.7.
42. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110; note 8 supra. One of the main reasons for
not advocating liability for violation of a police manual was brought out by the
amici curiae. They claimed such liability would deter the police department from
making rules at all. 24 Cal. 3d at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. 364 n.7;
see text accompanying note 52.
43. 24 Cal. 3d at 241-42, 594 P.2d at 478, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361; CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 669 (West Supp. 1980) states in part:
presumes lack of due care and thus negligence, the only question
which remained was whether or not Officer Vershaw could rebut
this presumption by evidence that he did "'what might reason-
ably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under
similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law.' "44
Since the trial court did not decide whether or not Officer Ver-
shaw desired to comply with the law, i.e., the police manual, the
officer "cannot be freed from liability without a judicial inquiry as
to whether he could successfully rebut the presumption." 45 The
fact that Vershaw's action was within the confines of California
Penal Code section 196, which permits the use of deadly force in
apprehending nonviolent fleeing felons, did not deter the court.
They found that section 196 did not compel the use of deadly
force;46 thus, a stricter rule could be imposed. The effect of the
court's ruling is that in California, local entities can promulgate
more stringent regulations than those contained in the state
codes. 47 In Peterson, that more stringent regulation was the
LBPD manual.
For a public agency to promulgate rules, however, as Justice
Newman had claimed the police department had done, there must
be a specific grant of authority "vested by constitution, statute,
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or prop-
erty;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which
the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation was adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what
might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, act-
ing under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the
law....
44. 24 Cal. 3d at 241, 247, 594 P.2d at 478, 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361, 365; CAL.
EvID. CODE § 669(b) (2) (West Supp. 1980); note 43 supra.
45. Id. at 247, 594 P.2d at 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
46. 24 Cal. 3d at 247 n.8, 594 P.2d at 482 n.8, 155 Cal. Rptr. 365 n.8. This reason-
ing was not explained by the court. Presumably, since Penal Code § 196 did not
compel the use of deadly force, Justice Newman took the liberty to conclude that a
police manual could rewrite the penal code so long as the manual placed addi-
tional limits on the use of deadly force. This was the substance of Justice Han-
son's dissent when the case was in the appellate court. Peterson v. City of Long
Beach, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
47. In the instant case, as in Long Beach Police Officer's Ass'n v. City of Long
Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1976), the police manual § 4242 was
stricter than California Penal Code § 196. The manual forbade the use of deadly
force by an officer except for situations involving violent crimes, note 11 supra.
The penal code, however, allowed the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing
felons even though violent crime is not involved nor threatened, notes 81-82 infra
and accompanying text.
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charter or ordinance." 48 Justice Newman said the authority had
been granted to the city manager and chief of police, but he did
not identify that specific grant of authority other than to say such
authority was vested "by charter or ordinance." 49
Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner and Mosk joined in the
majority opinion.
B. The Dissent
Justice Richardson disagreed; he found that the police manual
could not establish a standard of care. He felt the manual was not
designed to protect persons within the plaintiffs' class from the
type of injury which in fact occurred. Justice Richardson noted
that the regulation was not designed to protect this class of per-
sons because the manual was intended only as guidance to the
police officer. The LBPD manual had intended section 4242 to be
a restraint over and above penal code section 196 so that it would
prevent acts by police officers which would later lead to law suits.
Justice Richardson thought it ironic "that guidelines which were
intended to shield against civil suits may now furnish the sole ba-
sis for imposing such liability." 50 Indeed, even the plaintiffs had
agreed: "'there is no dispute as to the rule ... that the violation
of the Police Manual Procedure will not be deemed the equivalent
of the violation of a statute or ordinance [under section 669].' "51
Both the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Bar
Association appearing as amici curiae supported the Long Beach
Police Department. They feared the result would be to inhibit the
preparation and publication of sorely needed guidelines for the
48. 24 Cal. 3d at 246, 594 P.2d at 481, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The court was refer-
ring to California Government Code § 811.6, which defines a regulation as a "rule,
regulation, order or standard, having the force of law, adopted by an employee or
agency ... of a public entity pursuant to authority vested by constitution, statute,
charter or ordinance in such employee or agency to implement, interpret, or make
specific the law enforced or administered by the employee or agency." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 811.6 (West 1980). Newman had a choice, he could define a police manual
as a local regulation as defined by § 811.6 or he could define the manual as admin-
istrative rulemaking. He chose the former.
49. 24 Cal. 3d at 244, 246, 594 P.2d at 480, 481, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 364.
50. Id. at 249, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (emphasis in original). Of course, Justice Richardson's position was in
contrast to that held by Newman as Newman had sought to emphasize that the
manual established a standard of care. Richardson's counter point was that the
manual could not be a standard of care because its very purpose was to go over
and above the standard of care set by the penal code so that the actions of the
police officers would be above attack by civil suits.
police which were over and above the statutory regulations.52 The
American Civil Liberties Union and the American Bar Associa-
tion did not believe the manual had the force of law, but they
both preferred a police manual which went over and above the
minimum standard of care established by the penal code.
Justices Clark and Manuel joined the dissent.
IV. HISTORICAL REVIEW
A. Prior Case History
The results in Peterson were foreshadowed by Dillenbeck v.
City of Los Angeles 53 and Grudt v. City of Los Angeles. 54 These
cases respectively held that the violation of a training bulletin
and the violation of a police tactical manual were admissible on
the subject of the standard of care.5 5 Justice Newman, in his ma-
jority opinion in Peterson, never mentioned these two cases; how-
ever, he applied their reasoning to arrive at his conclusion in
Peterson that police manuals have the force of law.
In Dillenbeck, the defendant city argued that the police training
bulletins were only "informative" or "instructive," and as such,
they were not rules evidencing a standard of care. Justice Tobri-
ner, echoing Justice Newman in his Peterson opinion, answered
this claim by stating that the bulletins "laid down a guide to con-
duct" and thus, established a minimal standard of care. 56 Like-
wise, the dissent in Dillenbeck was similar to Justice Richardson's
position in Peterson. The Dillenbeck dissent noted the training
bulletins were only informative and instructive and were in the
nature of written lectures. Justice Burke in the Dillenbeck dis-
sent argued that the bulletins were taken out of context and given
a meaning and a standard of care which the authors of the bulle-
tin had never intended.
Dillenbeck had taken its standard of care from the earlier case
of Torres v. City of Los Angeles, which held that "the degree of
52. Id.
53. 69 Cal. 2d 472, 466 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968). See note 2 supra for
facts of the case.
54. 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970). See note 3 supra for
facts of the case.
55. 69 Cal. 2d at 479, 446 P.2d at 133, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 325. "[TIhe jury should
have had the opportunity to consider [the bulletins] as evidence of the require-
ments for public safety necessary to meet the standard of due care in the opera-
tion of an emergency vehicle." Id.
56. Id. The court found that in determining whether or not an employer's di-
rective is a safety rule which would be admitted on the issue of negligence, "the
issue turns on whether the directive in question affords a specific indication of the
employer's reconciliation of the conflict between maximum efficiency in opera-
tions and maximum safety to the public." Id.
[Vol. 8: 419, 19811 Police Shootings
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
care lawfully imposed upon the agents or the employees of a mu-
nicipality is that care consistent with the exercise of ordinary pru-
dence in all the prevailing circumstances." 57 Thus in 1962, Torres
used the standard of care of a private citizen. Yet, Torres and Dil-
lenbeck are both distinguishable from the fact situation in Peter-
son. Torres involved a manual on the safe operation of fire trucks,
while Dillenbeck involved a manual on the safe operation of po-
lice vehicles, but neither involved the use of deadly force to stop
fleeing felons as Peterson had. The negligent use of municipal ve-
hicles is a vastly different factual setting than the affirmative use
of deadly force to stop fleeing felons. Evidently, after Peterson,
the court views the standard of care as the same in these widely
divergent situations. 58
It was the Grudt decision which applied the Dillenbeck stan-
dard of care to a fact situation involving the use of firearms by po-
lice. Grudt simply cited Dillenbeck, which stated that the rules
for the use of firearms "represent an informed judgment" and the
violation of such rules "'serves as evidence of negligence.' ",59 So
by a brief quote, Grudt applied the Dillenbeck and Torres stan-
dard of care to a police shooting incident. Peterson was the next
case to use the Grudt reasoning, but Peterson went further, and
declared that the police manual had the force of law.
Professor Uelmen, concerned about the effect of these rulings,
stated: "The simple truth is that the Dillenbeck and Grudt rul-
ings will deter and have deterred some police administrators from
producing a clear enunciation of policy."60 Uelmen argues this
fear of civil liability by police administrators is nonetheless a mis-
conception; since a clearly enunciated policy would actually serve
to limit liability by requiring officers to more consistently meet a
uniform standard of conduct. Peterson, however, would not seem
to alleviate any of the fears of police administrators; obviously in
Peterson, liability was not avoided. Professor Uelmen then noted
57. 58 Cal. 2d 35, 51, 372 P.2d 906, 916, 22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876 (1962).
58. Torres used the standard of care of a private citizen just as Kortum v. Al-
kire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1977), would later use in 1977, by requir-
ing a police officer to use the standard of care of a private citizen when using
deadly force. See note 28 supra for a discussion of the facts of Kortum.
59. 2 Cal. 3d at 588, 468 P.2d at 831, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
60. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 25. Professor Uelmen also noted that a committee
of the American Bar Association recommended that "a violation of administrative
policy should not result in mandatory civil liability." Id. at 25 n.64; ABA PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION (Tentative Draft, March 1972) § (b) (ii).
a Catch-22 situation. If police departments do not produce clearly
enunciated manuals, liability of a city may be premised on the
lack of training given to police officers.61
Perhaps in response to the possibility of liability, the court of
appeal, in 1976, decided Vallas v. City of Chula Vista,62 which
held that a police manual was not a statute, ordinance, or regula-
tion which carried civil liability. However, the next year, this de-
cision was countered by a different court of appeal in Kortum
which held police officers to the same standards of care as private
citizens in the use of deadly force. Finally in 1979, the Peterson
decision was issued.
It would simply be speculative to attempt to predict future ac-
tions of police departments where they face liability for clearly
enunciated manuals and also liability for vague manuals. It
would, however, be doubtful that all written police policy would
disappear. As long as there is any policy, it would be admissible
under the Dillenbeck-Grudt holdings regardless of whether or not
it is in writing.63
B. Liability and Methods of Controlling the Police
The issue of liability of government officers has its roots in the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which prevented suits against a
state by its citizens. 64 Treating the doctrine as an anachronism, 65
many states have concluded that it is mistaken and unjust for a
government to refuse redress to its citizens. Yet the state should
not accept liability for all harms. The public has a vital interest in
the free and independent judgment of its officers. 66 That free
judgment would not exist if the threat of a lawsuit constantly
hung over the heads of the governmental agents. Chief Justice
Traynor had developed a formula so that California may provide
an acceptable amount of governmental immunity. "Governmental
61. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 25-26.
62. 56 Cal. App. 382, 128 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1976); see notes 21 and 23 supra and
accompanying text.
63. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 25.
If policy is perceived as a prophylactic device designed for maximum flex-
ibility in "backing up" an officer in his decisions, it may well be that max-
imum flexibility can be maintained by having no policy, or by not putting
policy in written form. If policy is perceived as a means of controlling the
conduct of police officers, however, a clearly formulated policy may serve
to limit liability by insuring that officers more consistently meet a uniform
standard of conduct.
Id.
64. K.C. DAvIs, ADMImSTRATIVE LAW TExT, 458-73 (3d ed. 1972).
65. Id. at 469 (citing Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359
P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961)).
66. Id. at 471 (citing Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal. 2d
224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961)).
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officials are liable for the negligent performance of their ministe-
rial duties ... but are not liable for their discretionary acts
within the scope of their authority . . even if it is alleged that
they acted maliciously .... -67 The distinction between ministe-
rial and discretionary duties is based upon the assumption that
discretionary decisions are necessarily nontortious. "It is not a
tort to govern."68 Free judgment must exist in the discretionary
area.
Of all governmental agents, police officers are treated differ-
ently as they are not entirely governed by the above rule. "They
usually enjoy no immunity even for action involving a good deal
of discretion."69
It is undoubtedly true that the immunity doctrine has been extended by
the courts in recent years from the highest ranks to many of the lessor
[sic] ranks, but we are not inclined to hold that its coverage extends to
the police officers of Washington National Airport. To do so, in our opin-
ion, would be carrying the doctrine too far.7
0
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Barr v. Matteo7 l that the princi-
ple of immunity extends to all governmental officers acting in the
line of duty. This was applied to officers far down the administra-
tive hierarchy but not to police officers sued for false arrest, false
imprisonment, excessive force, and the like.7 2
One of the reasons offered for treating police differently is that
police powers are substantially different. Subordinates, far re-
moved in the line of authority, have wide discretionary authority
in the field73 as compared with the more limited authority of state
employees in other state agencies. This wide authority in the of-
67. Id. at 470 (citing Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 220,
359 P.2d 457, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961)); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 557
(1976).
68. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 64, at 469.
69. Id. at 489.
70. Craig v. Cox, 171 A.2d 259, 262 (D.D.C. 1961), affid, 304 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
71. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
72. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 559.
73. K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 88 (1969):
No other federal, state or local agency . . . delegates so much power to
subordinates. No other agency ... does so little supervising of vital policy
determinations which directly involve justice or injustice to individuals.
And no other agency.., makes policy which in such a large degree is il-
legal or of doubtful legality.
Brent, Redress of Alleged Police Misconduct: A New Approach to Citizen Corn-
plaints and Police Disciplinary Procedures, XI U.S.F. L REV. 587, 589-90 (1977).
ficers resulted in attempts to limit it by removing immunity.74 In
order to understand the extent of this lack of immunity and when
liability attaches, the various methods of police control must be
reviewed since liability varies with the method of control.
Professor Goldstein has pointed out several methods of civilian
control of the police, 75 and the accompanying weaknesses. Civil
action is always possible but the costs to the civilian plaintiffs can
be prohibitive. Judicial review is limited to the exclusionary rule
and it is questionable whether it has adequate influence on the
future behavior of the officer.76 Civilian review boards are not
equipped to initiate actions against police officers as they are usu-
ally given no such powers. Simply airing public grievances
against police officers has limited function. Goldstein advocated
an ombudsman concept which has control over internal discipli-
nary procedures.
C. The Use of Deadly Force by Various California Police
Departments Under the California Penal Code
The California Penal Code advocates a method of police control
and a source of liability especially in the area of the use of deadly
force. Penal Code section 835(a) provides: "Any peace officer
who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be ar-
rested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force
to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance
74. Brent, supra note 73, at 590.
75. Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police
Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 168-70 (1967). See Cohen, The Police Internal
System of Justice in New York City, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 54 (1972) for discussion
of internal control. Cohen outlines a statistical study of complaints against officers
which notes that of the sample studied, 41.7% of all officers received complaints
either from the department or from citizens. Ninety-five percent had fewer than
five complaints. Id. at 56. Of the complaints which were received, most were de-
partmental: 64% were departmental; 9.5 were criminal complaints; the remaining
26% were civilian complaints. Id. at 57. Of the civilian complaints received, half
involved the charge of the use of unnecessary force. Approximately 85% of the ci-
vilian complaints were dismissed or filed while 15% came to trial. Id. at 62. Of the
departmental complaints, however, 59% were brought to trial. The reason why
more civilian complaints were dismissed than departmental complaints is because
departmental complaints, being brought by superior officers, were found to be
more substantial, and thus, had a stronger basis than civilian complaints. Id. at 60.
76. See McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1972).
Judge McGowan would pursue court involvement beyond that of the exclusionary
rule. Instead of merely consigning cases to the official reports, McGowan urged
the embodiment of police practices into rules which would then be scrutinized by
the courts promptly after issuance. This, according to McGowan, would greatly
expand the court's authority over the police, because courts would now review
more police practices directly instead of just those which are linked to evidence
gathering and the exclusionary rule. Id. at 686-87.
436
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.... 77 The penal code also authorizes the use of deadly force.
Section 197(1),78 allows both a police officer and a private citizen
to defend himself or another against death or great bodily harm
inflicted by another. In addition, a police officer and a private citi-
zen may use deadly force to prevent commission of a felony but
only those felonies which threaten serious bodily harm.79
The requirements for the use of deadly force, however, change
once the felony has been committed and the goal is the apprehen-
sion of the felon. When a felony has taken place, both a private
citizen and a police officer may use deadly force to apprehend the
felon.80 In addition, Penal Code section 196(3) allows the officer
to use deadly force to arrest "persons charged with a felony, and
who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest."81 The key
word is "charge" and this provision has been liberally construed
to allow the use of deadly force by a police officer upon reason-
able belief that a person is fleeing after the commission of a fel-
ony even though no felony has actually been committed.8 2
When it comes to the issue of escape of a felon as opposed to
prevention of a' felony, the law does not concern itself with the
type of felony. The police officer's right to use deadly force exists
even though there is no threat of danger to the safety of any per-
son.83 Murphy v. Murray,84 which was cited by the trial court in
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 835(a) (West 1970).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1970) provides in part:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of the
following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a
felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or
4. When necessarily committed attempting, by lawful ways and means,
to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully sup-
pressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
(Emphasis added).
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(1) (West 1970).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(4) (West 1970). Note 78 supra.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West 1970). Section 196 provides in part:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and those act-
ing by their command in their aid and assistance, either-
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been res-
cued or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting persons
charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such ar-
rest.
82. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 6.
83. Id. at 6 n.21.
84. 74 Cal. App. 726, 241 P. 938 (1925); note 15 supra and accompanying text.
Peterson,8 5 illustrated this point because its holding is identical
with the current penal code in allowing the application of deadly
force to apprehend nonviolent fleeing felons.
Now, Peterson limits this liberal construction of the penal code;
the right of a police officer to use deadly force against an escaping
nonviolent felon is restricted by the language found in police
manuals which are given the status of "regulations of a public en-
tity" by Peterson. Presumably, if the police manual itself had al-
lowed such force or had repeated verbatim section 19686 of the
California Penal Code, the police officer could still use deadly
force against a nonviolent felon. Murphy may have been chal-
lenged but section 196 is still valid.
In California, the penal code provisions on deadly force are very
broad and allow much discretion by the individual police officer.87
The code provisions are broad enough so that a fourteen-year-old
boy fleeing the scene of an auto theft could be justifiably killed.88
This illustrated Kenneth Davis's point that case by case discre-
tion by police in the field can be denial of equal justice.89
Professor Uelmen, in an expansive and detailed statistical anal-
ysis of the use of deadly force by the fifty police departments in
Los Angeles County, pointed out remarkable disparities in this
broad police discretion.90 He found that the police policies
adopted with respect to fleeing felons were surprisingly diverse,
especially in determining which felons were considered danger-
85. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09 n.4.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1970); note 81 supra and accompanying text.
87. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 6. Professor Uelmen went on to summarize the
problem under the California Penal Code:
The bare skeleton of the Penal Code provisions offers no guidance as to
which felonies should be regarded as sufficiently dangerous to justify
resorting to deadly force to prevent their commission or to capture the
perpetrator. Nor do the statutes suggest the use of non-deadly force if the
felon is a juvenile or is known to be intoxicated or otherwise incapaci-
tated. Such guidelines must come from police administrators.
Id. Under Peterson, it is these "guidelines" which have force of law and its attend-
ant civil liability.
88. Id.
89. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 99. According to Professor Davis, the denial of
equal justice occurs when there is a disparity in the handling of one situation by
an officer in contrast to another situation in the field. "The police obviously need
rules. That is why they have always had rules, such as the present general orders
and special orders .... The Chicago Police are seriously deficient, in my opinion,
in the extent to which disparity from case to case produces a denial of equal jus-
tice." Id. at 98-99.
90. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 7-15. All 50 police departments within Los Ange-
les County were surveyed. Professor Uelmen provided three tables outlining each
department's policy on the use of deadly force. Of course, the study is subject to
subsequent police department modification of their own policies following the date
of the study in 1973.
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ous enough to justify use of deadly force. 9' Uelmen found that
there were five types of police department policies. First, some
departments did not restrict the breadth of the penal code provi-
sions, and thereby allow deadly force to be used in all situations
allowed by the code, including situations involving nonviolent fel-
ony crime. Second, other departments would prohibit the use of
deadly force against fleeing adults whether or not they were vio-
lent or showed potential for violence. Third, other departments
significantly limit the type of felony from which a suspect must be
fleeing before deadly force may be used, permitting it in an armed
robbery situation while prohibiting it in the case of the fleeing
burglary suspect. The Los Angeles Police Department was in this
category. Fourth, some of the departments which limit the type of
felony from which a suspect must be fleeing also prohibit use of
deadly force against fleeing juveniles, i.e., deadly force could only
be used in the case of a fleeing adult armed robbery suspect. This
was the category in which the Long Beach Police Department was
classified. It is notable that the LBPD has one of the more strin-
gent policies on the use of deadly force. Arguably, had the LBPD
had a less stringent policy such as those departments, which fol-
low the penal code, then the officers in Peterson would not have
been in violation of their manual, hence the result of Peterson
would obviously be different. Finally, there were those depart-
ments which follow a policy of self-defense or defense of others
before use of deadly force is allowed.
Uelmen also found that this disparity in police policy was not
due to geography, race, arrest rates, or the character of the com-
munity.92 Rather, this disparity is attributable to the individual
likes and dislikes of the particular police chief who alone usually
chooses the policy.93 Davis's solution was police rulemaking.
"JE]very police chief executive should formalize procedures for
91. Id.
92. Id. at 12-15.
93. Id. at 15. Uelmen summarized his conclusion as follows:
Nor do the variations appear to be the result of varying community senti-
ments as to the vigor with which law enforcement officers should pursue
fleeing felons. An inquiry as to how police policy is formulated discloses
that the major factor which accounts for this wide disparity in policy is the
equally wide diversity in the personal philosophies of the fifty chiefs of
police who administer the various police departments in Los Angeles
County.
Id.
developing and implementing the . . . written agency policy. '94
The formality of administrative rulemaking would replace the
subjective choice of one man. Professor Uelmen would urge that
a statewide police policy board be established to insure uniform-
ity of policy.95
V. RULEMAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Present State of Administrative Law
The California Administrative Procedure Act 96 [hereinafter Cal-
ifornia APA] promulgates the principles for adoption of adminis-
trative rules and regulations. If a state decides to use the
administrative rulemaking procedures as a method of police con-
trol, it must consider the conditions under which rulemaking has
the force of law and the conditions under which liability attaches.
Professor Davis advocates introducing the use of such administra-
tive procedures as an alternative method of police control.
Administrative law recognizes that agencies issue three types
of rules. 97 First, procedural housekeeping rules establish the con-
trol of the agency's own operation, its rulemaking, and adjudica-
tive hearings. Such rules would be binding. "In other words, an
agency decision will usually be reversed if a regulated party can
show that the agency did not comply with its own [procedural]
rules."98 Second, interpretive rules would outline the agency's in-
formal opinion on the meaning of a statute or its terms. It is a
clarification or explanation of existing laws rather than a modifi-
cation of them. The agency's interpretive rules are significant but
94. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 101.
95. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 62-64. The idea of a board to review police policy
takes varied forms. Prior to becoming Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Warren Burger advocated the establishment of an independent review
board composed of a majority of civilians, but with some police participation. Bur-
ger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964); see Brent, supra
note 73, at 588. Such efforts at review of police activity will not, however, be aided
by the federal courts. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a federal district court
in Philadelphia issued an injunction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), requiring the police department to restructure its complaint procedures
and disciplinary system. The injunction was supposed to eliminate unconstitu-
tional conduct on the part of police officers. In addition to finding that the plain-
tiffs had a lack of standing, the court ruled that control of police departments is
primarily a local matter. Thus, the role of federal courts in such matters is greatly
diluted.
96. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11340-11445 (West Supp. 1980) (originally codified at
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11370-11528 (West 1966) (repealed, effective July 1, 1980));
Hutchinson, Rule Making Function of California Administrative Agencies, 15 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 272, 272-73 (1964).
97. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 108-10; E. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS, 122-27 (1972); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 153.
98. E. GELLHORN, supra note 97, at 123; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 153.
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do not have the force of law.99 Finally, substantive or legislative
agency rules have the force of law. They are the equivalent of a
statute or ordinance and must be issued pursuant to statutory
authority. Such rules create law just as a statute does and com-
pel compliance by their terms.1 00
The next question concerns which administrative law applies.
If the agency is created by Congress, the federal Administrative
Procedure Act [hereinafter federal APA] will govern its rulemak-
ing procedures.101 If the agency is created by the California Leg-
islature, the California APA applies.102 The type of rulemaking
can have major ramifications. If a rule is merely procedural or in-
terpretive, it is not covered by the federal APA.103 The same was
true in California; the California APA did not cover procedural or
interpretive rules.104 Recently, however, California changed its
position in another decision by Justice Newman holding that in-
terpretive rules by state agencies are now to be governed by the
California APA.105 Arguably, if Davis had prevailed in his view
99. E. GELLHORN, supra note 97, at 123-25; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 154,
161.
100. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 154-55, 160-61.
101. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq. Section 551 provides:
"'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States."
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980): "the provisions of this article
are applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by any stat-
ute."
103. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) provides:
General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either per-
sonally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with
law.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply-
(A) to interpretive rules....
(Emphasis added). 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976): 'The required publication or service
of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date,
except .... (2) Interpretive rules .. "
104. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980). This statute specifically pro-
vided that the California APA applied only to the "exercise of quasi-legislative
power conferred by any statute." There is no statute conferring power to make in-
terpretive rules, so interpretive rules were not originally under the California
APA. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 103-04. But see notes 105 and 134-41 infra and
accompanying text.
105. Armistead v. State Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 204, 583 P.2d 744, 747, 149
Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1978) (Newman, J.): "Under ... the APA, rules that interpret and
implement other rules have no legal effect unless they have been promulgated in
substantial compliance with the APA."
that police manuals contain interpretative rules, they too would
be under the California APA.
In addition, legislative rules with the force of law must be is-
sued according to either federal or state APA rules.106 Also, there
is one overriding rule; all rules which are issued and are governed
by either the federal or California APA must be issued under a
specific legislative grant of authority.l0 7
One problem which arises, especially in relation to the federal
APA, is distinguishing between interpretive and legislative rules.
The analysis is as follows: if the main rule or standard is con-
tained in a regular statute or a code, then any agency rule which
is issued on the same subject as that statute or code, must be
merely interpretive. The simple reason being that, if the agency
rule is merely referring to a standard already contained in a code;
then the agency rule can only be interpreting that code.
The question is then what type of rules do the police depart-
ments make? Arguably, police manuals in California contain in-
terpretive rules, because the original standard of care in the use
of firearms by police was contained in the penal code. Thus, the
governing standard was in the code and not the manual; so the
manual could be said to be merely interpreting that code. The
manual in Peterson, however, had even stricter requirements than
the code. As such, that particular police manual did more than in-
terpret the code. This supports Justice Richardson's view that the
manual did not contain rules at all, but rather constituted a guide-
line designed to prevent any action by an officer which might
cause liability. 08
Finally, if a rule is under either the federal or California APA,
notice and opportunity to participate must be provided to inter-
ested parties' 09 to allow them to make their contribution to the
formulation of the rule. It helps to prevent arbitrary, capricious,
or uninformed rulemaking.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) excludes only interpretive rules from the federal APA;
see note 103 supra. California includes "quasi-legislative power" under its provi-
sions; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980); see note 102 supra.
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980); see note 102 supra.
108. Note 47 supra.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976): "[N]otice of proposed rulemaking shall be pub-
lished in the federal register." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976): "[T]he agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11346.8 (West Supp. 1980):
[Tihe state agency shall afford any interested person or his duly author-
ized representative, or both, the opportunity to present statements, argu-
ments, or contentions in writing, with or without opportunity to present
the same orally. The state agency shall consider all relevant matter
presented to it before adopting, amending or repealing any regulation.
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B. Statutory Authority for Police Rulemaking
Professor Davis pointed out that "'legislative rules' that have
the force of law, like statutes, cannot be validly issued in the ab-
sence of a legislative grant of power to make rules having force of
law."110 California has not granted that rulemaking authority to
police departments. There is no provision in any of the California
codes granting police administrators any rulemaking powers."'
Indeed this situation appears to be nationwide. Professor Davis
noted that "[s]o far as I know, rulemaking procedure is unknown
to American police."" 2 Nonetheless, Justice Newman found that
the LBPD manual had standards on the use of weapons and these
"standards have the 'force of law' and were adopted ... pursuant
to authority vested by character or ordinance to implement, inter-
pret, or make specific the law administered."' 13 Justice Newman
did not identify that source of authority other than to say that city
managers and police chiefs, as heads of "a form of public author-
ity," have power to promulgate rules and that such power is "con-
ceded" to them.114 No legislative grant of authority was found in
Peterson; yet, Justice Newman found the LBPD manual to have
the force of law."15
Davis was concerned about the problem presented when police
departments are held to be rulemaking agencies yet have no
grant of authority.116 "[Hlow can the courts allow the police to
110. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11342.1 (West Supp.
1980):
Except as provided in section 11344, nothing in this chapter confers au-
thority upon or augments the authority of any state agency to adopt, ad-
minister, or enforce any regulation. Each regulation adopted to be
effective, must be within the scope of authority conferred and in accord-
ance with standards prescribed by other provisions of law.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11342.2 (West Supp. 1980):
Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency
has authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific
or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted
is valid or effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute
and reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 96, at 272-73; Uelmen, supra note 1, at 7; B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 67, at 154.
111. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 7.
112. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 103.
113. 24 Cal. 3d at 246, 594 P.2d at 481, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
114. Id. at 244, 594 P.2d at 480, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
115. Id. at 246, 594 P.2d at 481, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
116. Davis's comments that there must be statutory authority before legislative
rules can be adopted could be countered by the concept of "legislation by estop-
make rules without statutory standards? The answer is a legal
anomaly, a serious flaw in judicial doctrine."' 1 7 "Conceivably, an
officer who was disciplined for a violation of department policy in
the discharge of a firearm could justly complain if his action was
sanctioned by the law of the state and the legislature had not del-
egated the power to, in any way, limit that sanction."118 Such was
the situation in Peterson; Officer Vershaw had acted in violation
of department policy. Yet, his action was within the limits of the
penal code. Davis's solution to this paradox was that since legis-
latures have not granted legislative rulemaking powers to the po-
lice, interpretive rules could be used by the police to circumvent
the lack of special authority. Interpretive rules need not evolve
from legislative authority and they would not necessarily impose
civil liability on police officers." 9 Moreover, liability would not at-
tach because interpretive rules merely explained existing law and
did not establish new law. These rules would not have the force
of law, and thus, reluctance by police to initiate administrative
procedures would be diminished.120 According to Davis's defini-
tion, a police manual would contain interpretive rules, for the
very reason that they were not promulgated pursuant to a legisla-
tive grant of power.121 The effect of Peterson, however, was to un-
dermine the use of Davis's solution in California; such rulemaking
by police can result in tort liability.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE PETERSON DECISION
The effects of Peterson become more vivid when they are con-
trasted with the position of Kenneth Davis. Peterson differs in
pel." This term was defined by Professor Schwartz when he recognized that in
some circumstances rulemaking could have a legal effect without any statutory au-
thority whatsoever; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 160; E. GELLHORN, supra note
97, at 124-25. For example, an interpretive rule, which is usually non-binding, could
be given binding effect if challenged in court and upheld, E. GELLHORN, supra note
97, at 124, or if it is already embodied in a formal regulation promulgated under the
agency's aegis, B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 161. "Legislation by estoppel" is,
however, simply a pragmatic consequence of the legal process. Id. at 155. It could
not be interpreted as a general grant of legislative rulemaking authority from the
legislature to police departments. The only reason such an interpretive rule would
be binding is because it would be upheld by a court decision. In any event, Justice
Newman did not base his decision on the concept of "legislation by estoppel."
Note, however, that LBPD manual § 4242, which was in issue in Peterson, was in-
deed challenged in court and upheld in Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1976), note 27-28 supra; how-
ever, this point, as well, did not form the basis of Justice Newman's opinion in Pe-
terson.
117. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 111.
118. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 7.
119. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110.
120. Id. at 106-08.
121. Id. at 110.
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three ways. First, Peterson labeled the police manual to be regu-
lations with the force of law; the practical result is that the police
manual has the same effect as legislative rules under administra-
tive rulemaking. They both have the force of law and both have
civil liability. This result differs from Davis's view which labels
police manuals as interpretive rules. Second, the effect of viewing
the manual as having force of law is to impose tort liability. By
imposing tort liability Peterson discourages the use of police
rulemaking to guide police activities, a function advocated by Da-
vis. Finally, if Davis's view of the police manual as interpretive
rulemaking were to prevail, the California Administrative Proce-
dure Act would be applied, with the result that the manual, which
was not promulgated by California APA procedures, would not
serve as a source of tort liability.
A. Regulations with the Force of Law
Regarding the first difference, when Justice Newman labeled
the police manual to be a regulation with the force of law, he cited
Kenneth Davis and his call for police administrative rulemak-
ing 122 and in fact made several references to Davis. There is, how-
ever, evidence that Newman was not really paying homage to
Davis's thesis; Newman's result differed greatly.
Justice Newman had a choice in characterizing the police man-
ual. He could fashion them as administrative regulations, as Pro-
fessor Davis had advocated, or he could have compared them to
local municipal regulations.123 He chose the latter and by so do-
ing, declined to introduce the California police departments to ad-
ministrative rulemaking.
There is at least one reason why Newman bypassed Davis's
plan. If Newman styled the manual as a city ordinance, then it
would be "a regulation of a public entity." As a "regulation of a
public entity," the manual would then be subject to California Ev-
idence Code Section 669, which presumed negligence for the vio-
lation of a regulation of a public entity. The code specifically
stated that "the failure of a person to exercise due care is pre-
122. 24 Cal. 3d at 245, 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 480, 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 364 n.7.
123. Local public entities such as cities can issue regulations. The California
Government Code defines this type of regulation as "a rule, regulation, order or
standard, having the force of law, adopted by an employee or agency ... of a pub-
lic entity pursuant to authority vested by constitution, statute, charter or ordi-
nance." CAL GOV'T CODE § 811.6 (West Supp. 1980).
sumed if [he] violated a ... regulation of a public entity." In con-
trast, the violation of an interpretive rule would not carry such
liability.124 Justice Newman chose to view the police manual as a
local regulation; in so doing, he chose the end result; civil tort lia-
bility. The question remains whether or not Newman chose to
consider the police manual as a local regulation solely for the pur-
pose of applying tort liability to the manual.
Newman did not stop at classifying the police manual as "rules
of a public entity," but forged on stating that "Section 4242 of the
police manual is, of course, a quasi-legislative measure."125 This
term, "quasi-legislative," is significant as the California Adminis-
trative Procedure Act is applied to any quasi-legislative power
conferred by any statute. 26 Thus, if a regulation is quasi-legisla-
tive, and there is proper authority to issue it, it must be issued
under state APA standards. The issue then is whether or not the
police manual is governed by the California APA because it is
"quasi-legislative." Peterson does not address this issue. Peter-
son does, however, list several attributes of police manuals: they
are quasi-legislative, they are adopted pursuant to charter or ordi-
nance, and they carry civil liability. Whether or not the California
APA applies remains at issue, but the practical effect of Peterson
is to hold the police manual to be synonomous with legislative
rules under administrative rulemaking. Both have the force of
law and both carry civil liability.
B. The Effect of Civil Liability
Davis's whole premise of police rulemaking was to guide po-
lice 127 rather than provide standards of care 128 which impose lia-
bility.129 Thus California, in applying tort liability to violations of
the police manual, actually seems to discourage the use of Davis's
124. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110.
125. 24 Cal. 3d at 247, 594 P.2d at 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
126. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980): "[T] he provisions of this arti-
cle are applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by any
statute heretofore or hereafter enacted. . . ." This provision requires that quasi-
legislative power be conferred by statute. Davis found that no such statute ex-
isted. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 103. Thus, California has conferred no authority
to police departments to issue rules. Davis responded to this situation by claiming
that no such authority was needed to issue interpretive rules which had no force
of law. This was Davis's solution to this lack of statutory authority: the police de-
partments could still issue these interpretive rules.
When Peterson claimed the police manual had force of law, the manual could no
longer be considered interpretive; it was for all practical purposes legislative for
the very reason that it now has the force of law.
127. 24 Cal. 3d at 245, 594 P.2d at 480-81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
128. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 108-11.
129. 24 Cal. 3d at 245, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting): "It is highly ironic, I suggest, that guidelines which were intended to
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ideas. The effective result of handcuffing police with the threat of
tort liability established by their own rules was vividly illustrated
by Professor Ulemen's discussion of the two cases which
foreshadowed Peterson: Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles 130 and
Grudt v. City of Los Angeles.131 Those cases had also applied tort
liability to a police training bulletin and a police tactical manual.
These two decisions have actually deterred some police adminis-
trators from producing a clear enunciation of policy.' 32
Peterson goes beyond both Dillenbeck and Grudt, which were
both based on the theory that the manuals involved were "safety
rules of an employer,"13 3 and thus, were also standards of care.
Peterson went further and actually claimed that the manual con-
tained regulations with the force of law. If Peterson expands the
concept of the police manual from "safety rules of an employer"
to regulations with the force of law, the reticence by police admin-
istrators is likely to expand. It would appear that Peterson would
have the same effect as Dillenbeck and Grudt. If the rules in a
police manual are used to apply civil liability, the incentive will
be to design the wording of the manual to avoid such a purpose.
This leaves the issue of whether or not such wording will lead to
vagueness rendering the guidelines ineffective.
C. The California Administrative Procedure Act
Justice Newman never stated that the police manual was gov-
erned by the California APA, which governs administrative regu-
lations; yet inexplicably, he went ahead and discussed the point
that the California APA differs from the federal APA.134 The
question arises then as to why Newman would discuss the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA] since he viewed
the police manual to be local rules not governed by the APA. The
answer becomes clear when the difference between the federal
and California APA is explored.
California has evidently established a position beyond that of
shield against civil suits may now furnish the sole basis for imposing such liabil-
ity." (Emphasis in original).
130. 69 Cal. 2d 472, 466 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968). See note 2 supra for a
discussion of the facts in this case.
131. 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970).
132. Uelmen, supra note 1, at 25.
133. Notes 2-3 supra.
134. 24 Cal. 3d at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.7.
the federal APA in Armistead v. State Personnel Board.135 This
decision, also written by Justice Newman, found that California
Government Code sections 11346 and 11342(b) "demonstrate a de-
sire to achieve in the California APA a much greater coverage of
rules than Congress sought in the federal APA."136 Section
11346137 states that the purpose of the California APA is to "estab-
lish basic minimum procedural requirements for adoption,
amendment or repeal of administrative regulations." Section
11342(b) 138 found that these regulations under the California APA
include interpretive rules. In other words, interpretive rules must
be promulgated under the guidelines of the California APA.139 In
contrast, the federal APA specifically excludes interpretive rules
from its purview.140 Thus in California, interpretive rules, which
usually would not have the force of law and usually would not re-
quire a specific grant of rulemaking authority, are now encom-
passed in the California APA.
135. 22 Cal. 3d 198, 583 P.2d 744, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978). In Armistead, a state
civil service employee wanted to withdraw his resignation. The State Personnel
Board refused claiming they had accepted the resignation. The Personnel Trans-
actions Manual allowed an employee to withdraw his resignation and continue
employment only with the approval of the "appointing power." The court, per Jus-
tice Newman, found the manual to contain interpretive administrative rules and,
in addition, found that the California APA applied to these interpretive rules.
136. Id. at 201-02, 583 P.2d at 745, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 2. See Peterson v. City of
Long Beach, 24 Cal. 3d at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.7. New-
man actually made reference to California Government Code §§ 11420 and
11371(b). Both have since been repealed and replaced with §§ 11346 and 11342(b)
respectively.
137. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346 (West Supp. 1980):
It is the purpose of this article to establish basic minimum procedural
requirements for the adoption, amendment or repeal of administrative
regulations. Except as provided in Section 11346.1, the provisions of this
article are applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power con-
ferred by any statute heretofore or hereafter enacted, but nothing in this
article repeals or diminishes additional requirements imposed by any
such statute. The provisions of this article shall not be superceded or
modified by any subsequent legislation except to the extent that such leg-
islation shall do so expressly.
138. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11342(b) (West Supp. 1980):
"Regulation" means every rule, regulation, order or standard of general
application or the amendment, supplement or revision of any such rule,
regulation, order or standard adopted by any state agency to implement,
interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to
govern its procedure, except one which relates only to the internal man-
agement of the state agencies. "Regulation" does not mean any instruc-
tions relating to the use of the form, but this provision is not a limitation
upon any requirement that a regulation be adopted pursuant to this part
when one is needed to implement the law under which the form is issued.
(Emphasis added).
139. Armistead v. State Personnel Board, 22 Cal. 3d 198, 204, 583 P.2d 744, 747,
149 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1978): "Under sections 11371(b), 11420, and 11440 of the APA,
rules that interpret and implement other rules have no legal effect unless they
have been promulgated in substantial compliance with the APA."
140. Note 103 supra.
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The point which Justice Newman was making in Armistead was
that the personnel transactions manual of the State Personnel
Board was interpretive in nature; thus, it must be adopted accord-
ing to state APA procedures. Since the manual was not duly
promulgated and published according to state APA procedures, it
was invalid. "[R]ules that interpret and implement other rules
have no legal effect unless they have been promulgated in sub-
stantial compliance with the APA."141
If Armistead were now applied to Peterson, the result would be
dramatic in that the LBPD manual also would have been found
invalid, because it was not "promulgated or published" according
to APA rules. Of course, if the LBPD manual had been found in-
valid, it could not have the "force of law," nor could it be a source
of tort liability.
The reason Justice Newman failed to apply the California APA
after labeling the LBPD manual as "quasi-legislative," could be
that Newman's ultimate goal was to find the police officers civilly
liable. To reach this goal, he had to avoid actually labelling the
police manual as administrative regulations under the California
APA because had the APA been applied, the LBPD manual would
have been invalid as it was not published and promulgated by
APA standards. Evidently, the goal of tort liability for police of-
ficers was far more important than the position that Davis has ad-
vocated for so long.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Newman could have accomplished in California what
Kenneth Davis had advocated for several years: that police
manuals should be viewed as administrative rulemaking. New-
man rejected Davis's view in several critical respects.
First, both Professor Davis and Justice Richardson have argued
that police manuals contain guidelines to guide behavior of the
police. They did not view the manuals as standards of care hav-
ing the force of law and accompanying civil liability. Rather,
these guidelines were intended to encourage the police officer to
perform above the minimum standards of care as established by
the California Penal Code. Davis called police manuals interpre-
tive rulemaking as there was no statutory authority to issue legis-
lative rules.
141. 22 Cal. 3d at 204, 583 P.2d at 747, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (emphasis added).
Though, Justice Newman cited Kenneth Davis and his call for
police administrative rulemaking, he chose to view the police
manual as a local regulation, not as an administrative rule. In so
doing, he predetermined the end result: civil tort liability. New-
man fashioned the manual as a local ordinance, the violation of
which presumes negligence.
Second, in applying tort liability to the police manual, Califor-
nia discourages, and indeed, precludes Professor Davis's plan to
use administrative rulemaking as a method of control over police
activities. Police, will be discouraged from promulgating rules
that will later be used against them.
Finally, though many labels were used to describe the police
manual the actual effect of Peterson is to equate the police man-
ual with legislative rules of administrative rulemaking; both now
have the force of law and both have civil tort liability attached.
Professor Davis did, however, propose to clarify the rulemaking
authority of police departments by noting that California has not
given police departments authority for this type of legislative
rulemaking. 142 Davis also noted that it appears to be contradic-
tory to hold the police liable for rulemaking on the one hand and
deny them the required legislative authority on the other. "The
answer is a legal anomaly, a serious flaw in the judicial doc-
trine."1 43 Davis suggests that the legislature act to correct this
flaw.
JAMES WRIGHT
142. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 103.
143. Id. at 111.
